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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The policy prescriptions of international institutions seeking to transform 
fresh water governance in Latin America are driven by fear of an impending 
crisis due to an absolute scarcity of fresh water.  The assumption that scarcity 
is the fundamental problem for the governance of fresh water resources leads 
to adoption of three main types of policy solutions.  One is to build a new 
institutional architecture to support integrated water resource management 
(IWRM) at the national and river basin levels.  The second is to emphasize 
new infrastructure to capture free flowing water, the transfer from regions of 
abundance to regions of deficit, and new technologies that make water 
delivery more efficient (e.g., drip irrigation).  The third solution is to treat 
water as an economic good by pricing it, creating transferable rights in water, 
and supporting the development of water markets.  
These policy prescriptions, coupled with World Bank and InterAmerican 
Development bank loans, have driven recent water reforms in Peru, a country 
where water conflicts have been numerous and often severe, posing difficult 
if not insuperable challenges for water governance.  Is water scarcity the 
reason for these conflicts, or are other factors equally if not more important?  
And, are policies shaped by a fear of impending scarcity part of the solution 
or part of the problem?  
Glacial retreat due to climate change has led to predictions of water 
scarcity, and Peru is no exception.  This perception of impending scarcity is 
acute in Peru’s Río Santa watershed, which extends from the snowcapped 
peaks of the Cordillera Blanca down to arid coastal lands in the regions of 
Ancash and La Libertad.  Fed by meltwaters from the world’s largest tropical 
glaciated land mass, the Santa watershed has become an international poster 
child for climate change.1  There is some debate among hydrologists as to 
whether and when river flows will diminish, but competition for the Santa’s 
waters is already severe.2  However, it is not clear from my analysis of water 
conflicts in the valley or from meetings and interviews with irrigators, 
                                                                                                                   
 1 See DAENE C. MCKINNEY & ALTON BYERS, U.S. AGENCY INT’L DEV., ADAPTATION TO 
CLIMATE CHANGE: CASE STUDY—GLACIAL RETREAT AND ADAPTATION OPTIONS IN PERU’S RIO 
SANTA BASIN, available at http://www.caee.utexas.edu/prof/mckinney/Peru/Peru%20Case%20S 
tudy%20Jul2011_v6_Draft_Final.pdf (exploring the specific characteristics and vulnerabilities of 
the Rio Santa Basin). 
 2 See, e.g., Barbara D. Lynch, Vulnerabilities, Competition and Rights in a Context of 
Climate Change: Toward Equitable Water Governance in Peru’s Rio Santa Valley, 22 
GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 364, 364 (2012). 
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fishers, local officials, and water managers that water competition is an 
artifact of scarcity.  Nor is it clear whether the water shortfalls experienced in 
the watershed are due to demography, climate change, or rising demand.  It 
is clear, however, that understanding water competition and conflict in terms 
of scarcity will have implications for technological and economic approaches 
to water management and, more broadly, for institutional approaches to 
water governance.  These approaches will have outcomes that may or may 
not be equitable. 
What are the implications for water management and water governance 
when water competition is understood in terms of scarcity?  To address these 
questions, I first review several different positions on water scarcity and their 
policy implications.  I then ask how these are reflected in the Peruvian water 
regime that has taken shape in the past decade.  Then, I look at water 
competition and conflict in the Río Santa Valley and ask whether and how 
they relate to scarcity and scarcity discourse.  I conclude by suggesting 
alternative approaches that might lead to more equitable or inclusive water 
governance and do more to prevent the water crisis predicted by international 
experts. 
II.  WATER SCARCITY AS A DRIVER OF WATER POLICY   
The idea of scarcity underlies much of the contemporary writing about 
water governance, writing that comes from a transnational network or 
epistemic community of water experts and, in many cases, proponents of 
IWRM.3  In 1992, members of this network crafted the Dublin Statement on 
Water and Sustainable Development, a set of very general policy guidelines 
prepared for the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development.  The statement opens with the following paragraph: 
Scarcity and misuse of fresh water pose a serious and growing 
threat to sustainable development and protection of the 
environment.  Human health and welfare, food security, 
industrial development and the ecosystems on which they 
depend, are all at risk, unless water and land resources are 
                                                                                                                   
 3 KEN CONCA, GOVERNING WATER: CONTENTIOUS TRANSNATIONAL POLITICS AND GLOBAL 
INSTITUTION BUILDING (2006). 
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managed more effectively in the present decade and beyond 
than they have been in the past.4 
Similarly, the World Bank’s 2008 World Development Report argues that 
agriculture is “by far the largest user of water, contributing to water 
scarcity.”5  The challenge, it states, is “to use less water in the face of 
growing water scarcities.”6  The World Bank opens its discussion of issues in 
a document entitled “Sustaining Water” by stating, “Water is a scarce 
resource that has a multitude of interdependent uses (irrigation, drinking 
water, sanitation, energy and environmental services).”7  A 2007 Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO) bulletin warns, “By 2025, 1,800 million 
people will be living in countries or regions with absolute water scarcity, and 
two-thirds of the world population could be under stress conditions.”8   
Not all members of the fresh water epistemic community are equally 
convinced that the world is running out of water.  The 2006 Human 
Development Report talks about a global water crisis but casts it in terms of 
water insecurity or deprivation of access to water.9  “The scarcity at the heart 
of the global water crisis,” it argues, “is rooted in power, poverty and 
inequality, not in physical availability,” and it identifies the underlying cause 
of scarcity as institutional and political rather than physical.10  Since 2010, 
preoccupation with risk and uncertainty has displaced scarcity discourse to 
some extent, and the term water stress is used with increasing frequency.11  
That said, the idea of scarcity continues to inform water governance debates. 
  
                                                                                                                   
 4 Int’l Conference on Water & the Environment, Jan. 26–31, 1992, The Dublin Statement 
on Water and Sustainable Development U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/PC/112 (Mar. 12, 1992), 
available at http://www.wmo.int/pages/prog/hwrp/documents/english/icwedece.html. 
 5 WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2008: AGRICULTURE FOR DEVELOPMENT 4 
(2008), available at https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/5990. 
 6 Id. at 182. 
 7 WORLD BANK, WORLD BANK GROUP IMPLEMENTATION PROGRESS REPORT OF THE WATER 
RESOURCES SECTOR STRATEGY, SUSTAINING WATER FOR ALL IN A CHANGING CLIMATE 4 
(2010), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/NEWS/Resources/sustainingwater.pdf. 
 8 WaterLex, Special Issue: Water Cooperation and Human Rights (Mar. 2013), available at 
http://www.waterlex.org/resources/documents/WWD%202013%20WaterLex%20 messages.pdf. 
 9 U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEV. REPORTS, BEYOND SCARCITY: POWER, POVERTY 
AND THE GLOBAL WATER CRISIS 3–6 (2006), available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/huma 
n-development-report-2006.pdf [hereinafter WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORTS 2006]. 
 10 Id. at 2. 
 11 See Len Abrams, Water Scarcity, THE WATER PAGE (Oct. 5, 2013), http://www.africanwate 
r.org/drought_water_scarcity.htm (explaining the different terms in international discourse).  
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Water scarcity is attributed to population growth, economic development, 
growing demand for food and other agricultural products, and urbanization 
on the one hand and inefficient, wasteful, and profligate use on the other.  It 
is widely thought that climate change will bring scarcity to an unprecedented 
level, creating new problems whose solutions are not to be found in 
traditional water management repertoires.  Glacial retreat in the Andean 
“water towers” is emblematic of this issue.  The 2010 World Development 
Report on Development and Climate Change states that changes in water 
availability “may be so rapid and unpredictable that traditional agricultural 
and water management practices may no longer be useful. . . .  This is 
already the case for the indigenous communities in the Cordillera Blanca in 
Peru, where farmers are facing such rapid changes that their traditional 
practices are failing.”12  Thus, the report deploys the specter of climate-
induced scarcity to delegitimate the local knowledge, institutions and 
practices of campesino communities13 and small farmers to justify the 
transfer of water management authority to state agencies. 
Viewing the problem of freshwater access in terms of absolute, physical 
scarcity has policy implications.  One set of policy prescriptions, emanating 
from a belief in scarcity emphasizes institutional change.  “Meeting the water 
scarcity, challenge,” according to the World Bank, “will require integrated 
management of water use at river-basin levels for better water allocation 
across sectors, and greater efficiency in the use of water within irrigation 
systems.”14  It goes on to argue that decentralized governance models are 
more likely to be successful than those reliant on centralized bureaucracies.15   
The question is whether water governance policies designed to manage 
water more efficiently produce inequities in water allocation and distribution 
that deprive some groups of access to the water essential for their lives and 
livelihoods.  On this point, Swyngedouw argues that “particular social 
groups lack access to water not because of real or alleged water scarcities, 
but because of differential entitlements associated with differential power 
                                                                                                                   
 12 WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2010, supra note 7, at 137. 
 13 Campesino communities, recognized by the state, are rural jurisdictions that may lie 
within or be coterminous with municipalities.  These rural settlements—descendents of the 
indigenous communities recognized in the early twentieth century—are characterized by 
collective land and water tenure and an elected president and directors, and a degree of 
autonomy from the municipalities and districts in which they are located. See INT’L LAND 
COAL., Campesinos Communities and Land Use, http://www.landcoalition.org/sites/default/ 
files/legacy/legacypdf/angoc/ch6/ch6p06.pdf?q=pdf/angoc/ch6/ch6p06.pdf. 
 14 WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2008, supra note 7, at 184. 
 15 Id. at 185. 
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relations.”16  He goes on to say that scarcity may be produced when fear of a 
“hydro-socio-ecological disaster” is used to justify investment in big water 
projects and water commodification.17  The 2006 UNDP Human 
Development Report puts it even more bluntly: “scarcity,” according to the 
report, is “manufactured through political processes and institutions that 
disadvantage the poor.”18  Thus, when coupled with policies that favor water 
consuming industries and the construction of large public works for water 
storage and transfer, political institutions and processes that under-represent 
the interests of poor and highly vulnerable water users can produce scarcity. 
Infrastructural approaches to addressing scarcity have also received 
considerable attention.  This is not surprising given the abundance of engineers 
in the epistemic community that has grown up around freshwater management 
and governance.  Addressing the problem of glacial retreat in the Andes and 
the Himalayas, the World Bank suggested additional investments in water 
storage, irrigation planning and system design.19  Criticized in the 1990s for its 
initial investment in the Chixoy, Narmada, and other ill-conceived dam and 
hydroelectric projects, the Bank moved away from lending for big 
infrastructure projects.20  But by 2003, it had returned to its earlier eagerness to 
fund big dam and water transfer project developments.21 
The European Declaration for a New Water Culture has criticized this 
emphasis on what it calls “supply-side strategies.”22  These strategies, which 
had become the normal mode of state intervention in water management by 
the mid-twentieth century, emphasized the construction of massive public 
                                                                                                                   
 16 ERIK SWYNGEDOUW, U.N. DEV. PROGRAM, HUMAN DEV. REPORT, Power, Water, and 
Money: Exploring the Nexus 63 (Feb. 2006) (Erik Swyngedouw), available at http://hdr.undp. 
org/en/reports/global/hdr2006/papers/swyngedouw.pdf. 
 17 Id. at 52. 
 18 WORLD DEV. REPORT, supra note 9, at 11.   
 19 2011 O.J. (L 2010/2270INI) 5–7, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/Lex 
UriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2013:056E:0067:0074:EN:PDF. 
 20 See generally International Rivers Network, The World Bank’s Big Dam Legacy 
(October 2007), available at http://www.internationalrivers.org/files/attachedfiles/the_world_ 
banks_big_dam_legacy.pdf (exploring previous projects and making recommendations). 
 21 Id. 
 22 Foundation for a New Water Culture, Madrid, Feb. 18, 2005, European Declaration for a 
New Water Culture, available at http://www.isiim.agropolis.org/OSIRIS/doc/EuropeNWC_dr 
ed.pdf. 
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works for water storage, transfer, and hydropower generation.23  The 
Declaration sees these projects, which are justified as scarcity-preventing, as 
scarcity producing.24  “Problems of scarcity,” it states, “are usually caused by 
abusive and unsustainable water use resulting from large-scale projects for 
economic development, rather than basic use by a population.”25  The 
supply-side approach, with its emphasis on infrastructure, has a powerful 
constituency—one that includes staff of international lending institutions, 
transnational engineering firms, and irrigation engineers working in 
government bureaucracies.26  At the end of the day, the emphasis on 
megaproject construction has helped to stimulate expansion of the very 
demands it was intended to satisfy.  Moreover, these megaprojects, despite 
much of the rhetoric that has surrounded them, turn out to be less about water 
conservation than about water redistribution and, as a corollary, the 
redistribution of water stress.    
In the course of over-stimulating demand, governments may also adopt 
policies that make access to water less equitable.  The European Water 
Declaration argues that the redistribution of scarcities associated with 
supply-side strategies exacerbate inequities “owing to the weakness of 
democratic systems in promoting social participation in the design, 
implementation and monitoring of [water] policies.”27   
The third, and perhaps dominant, approach to the problem of scarcity is 
economic.  Conca points out that the idea that treating water as a scarce 
economic resource will lead to its conservation is central to the IWRM 
paradigm.28  This assumption underlies the guidelines or principles produced 
by the 1992 Dublin Water Conference, a meeting of international water 
experts in preparation for the 1992 UN Environment and Development 
Conference in Rio de Janeiro.29  The fourth and most widely accepted of the 
Dublin principles defines water as an economic good and links scarcity to the 
                                                                                                                   
 23 See, e.g., SANJEEV KHAGRAM, DAMS AND DEVELOPMENT: TRANSNATIONAL STRUGGLES 
FOR WATER AND POWER (2004); PATRICK MCCULLY, SILENCED RIVERS: THE ECOLOGY AND 
POLITICS OF LARGE DAMS (2001).     
 24 International Rivers Network, supra note 20, at 1–2. 
 25 European Declaration for a New Water Culture, supra note 22. 
 26 For example, Ministries of Energy, Natural Resources, and Economy and Finance. 
 27 European Declaration for a New Water Culture, supra note 22, at 8. 
 28 CONCA, supra note 3. 
 29 International Conference on Water and the Environment, The Dublin Statement on Water 
and Sustainable Development (Jan. 31, 1992), available at http://www.undocuments.net/h 2o-
dub.htm. 
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failure to recognize its economic value.30  In so doing, as Conca observes, the 
statement steered water governance discourse away from an emphasis on 
water as a basic human right.31  This shift was consonant with the general 
neoliberal trend in global trade and development policy. 
In the wake of the Cochabamba water war of 2000, rights discourse has 
reemerged in international water discussions, culminating in the adoption of 
the July 2010 UN General Assembly resolution recognizing access to clean 
water and sanitation as a human right.32  Nonetheless, UNESCO’s fourth 
World Water Development Report states that “a sense of the economic value 
of water in its different states and uses is a necessary part of water 
management.”33  The report goes on to suggest that in well-functioning water 
markets, prices can reflect the value of water necessary to secure the most 
valuable water uses.34  The report backs away from a market fundamentalist 
position, calling instead for regulation by public institutions.35 
Economic prescriptions deriving from an emphasis on scarcity range from 
elimination of subsidies for profligate water use to water pricing and the 
development of water markets.36  Water markets are seen as contributing to 
the efficient allocation of water among diverse users.  Liberalization of trade 
policies, the Bank argues, would lead to greater efficiency by encouraging 
the import of water-intensive commodities to water-scarce nations, which 
would in turn specialize in less thirsty crops with higher market value.37  In a 
study for the World Bank, De la Torre, Fajnzylber, and Nash argue that 
water marketization would facilitate inter-basin water transfers to alleviate 
regional scarcity and dam building and hydropower development would 
reduce the impacts of variation in yearly river flow.38  Lastly, the 2010 
                                                                                                                   
 30 Id. 
 31 See CONCA, supra note 3. 
 32 G.A. Res. 64/292 ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/64/292 (July 28, 2010), available at http://www. 
un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/64/292. 
 33 U.N. EDUC., SCIENTIFIC, & CULTURAL ORG., THE UNITED NATIONS WORLD WATER 
DEVELOPMENT REPORT 4: MANAGING WATER UNDER UNCERTAINTY AND RISK 284 (2012), 
available at http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/SC/pdf/WWDR4%20 
Volume%201-Managing%20Water%20under%20Uncertainty%20and%20Risk.pdf. 
 34 Id. at 220. 
 35 Id. at 272. 
 36 See generally WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2008, supra note 5. 
 37 Id. 
 38 See generally The World Bank, The International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Redevelopment, Low Carbon, High Growth: Latin American Responses to Climate Change 
(2009) (Augusto de la Torre, Pablo Fajnzylber, John Nash), available at http://www.preventi 
onweb.net/files/7574_bm10121.pdf. 
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World Development Report calls for transferrable water rights, full-value 
pricing, and well-regulated markets coupled with strong institutions and 
expert information.39 
The emphasis on scarcity in international policy circles raises several 
questions.  First, what is scarcity?  Second, is scarcity an appropriate point of 
departure for conversations about water governance and allocation?  Third, 
what problems does an emphasis on scarcity occlude, and what problems 
might it exacerbate?  Fourth, are the institutional, infrastructural, and 
economic policies proposed to combat scarcity likely to improve or restrict 
access to water, particularly for populations and ecosystems that are highly 
vulnerable in the face of natural and economic disasters.  
Swyngedouw in an exhaustive, if provocative, background paper for 
UNDP devotes considerable attention to the negative effects of scarcity 
discourse on water equity and asks us to differentiate between scarcity and 
restricted access to water.40  His basic argument is that the water scarcity 
experienced by particular groups in society is relative and has little 
relationship to its absolute availability; rather, it is socially produced.41  Lack 
of access to water occurs “not because of real or alleged water scarcities, but 
because of differential entitlements associated with differential power 
relationships.”42  This position is shared by scholars from the Stockholm 
Water Institute, who talk about “scarcities” rather than “scarcity” and define 
these as “socially and politically induced challenges.”43 
Reference to scarcity as the cause of water stress has political, 
ideological, and economic implications.  On the economic side, 
Swyngedouw concludes that scarcity discourse serves as a justification for 
supply-side investment—construction of infrastructure for water capture and 
for its transfer from places where it is perceived to be abundant to those 
where it is apparently scarce—and for water commodification, if not 
privatization.44  But the function of scarcity in the marketization of water 
goes further.  Scarcity, for Swyngedouw, is what makes the market work.  
Therefore, making a market-based strategy for water governance work may 
                                                                                                                   
 39 WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2010, supra note 5, at 49–58. 
 40 See generally SWYNGEDOUW, supra note 16. 
 41 Id. at 7. 
 42 Id. at 63. 
 43 Hakan Tropp, Malin Falkenmark & Jan Lundqvist, SIWI (Stockholm Int’l Water Inst.), 
Water Governance Challenges: Managing Competition and Scarcity for Hunger and Poverty 
Reduction and Environmental Sustainability, in 13 HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT OFFICE 
OCCASIONAL PAPER 3 (2006). 
 44 Power, Water, and Money, supra note 16, at 49, 64. 
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require the social production or engineering of scarcity.  Proponents of water 
markets may find it helpful in such cases to attribute the resulting 
maldistribution of water to naturally or demographically produced scarcity.  
In this context, environmentalists who define water resource problems in 
terms of water scarcity may unwittingly find themselves in the position of 
creating the very shortfalls they seek to prevent.   
Alternative framings of fresh-water issues may do more in the long run to 
encourage water conservation and to achieve more equitable allocation.  
Greater attention to how water uses can be complementary rather than 
competitive, for example, may encourage the development of strategies for 
equitable allocation across sectoral lines.  An emphasis on complementarity 
can also create opportunities for conservation and water reuse.  For example, 
in northern Peru I found complementarites between use for milling, cloth 
processing, micro hydro, and irrigation as well as between upstream and 
downstream agricultural uses.45  At the river basin level, a water regime 
based on complementarity would oblige upstream water users to maintain the 
capacity of the landscape to store water and to use it in ways that permit 
urban and agricultural reuse at lower elevations.  The burden of behavioral 
change would fall on major polluters.  In sum, however, but an emphasis on 
maintenance of a usable water supply and sharing during shortfalls may 
reduce vulnerability. 
Similarly, emphasis on water stress, rather than scarcity, would draw 
attention to the needs of groups whose lives and livelihoods are particularly 
vulnerable to changes in water quality as well as availability.  Lastly, a focus 
on access, although it may lead to the supply-side solutions that create new 
demands, draws our attention to the distribution of water across ethnic, 
national, and socioeconomic lines.   
III.  SCARCITY AND WATER POLITICS IN PERU46 
Water scarcity is a problematic concept in Peru, yet it underlies major 
changes in the nation’s water regime, changes which include its 2009 water 
law which authorized the establishment of a centralized agency for water 
                                                                                                                   
 45 See Barbara Deutsch Lynch, The Bureaucratic Transition: Peruvian Government 
Intervention in Sierra Small-Scale Irrigation (1988) (dissertation, Cornell University). 
 46 Unless otherwise noted, data for this section is drawn from unstructured, open-ended 
interviews conducted by the author in Lima and Huaraz with officials of the Autoridad 
Nacional del Agua (ANA), the Ministry of the Environment (MINAM), the Defensoria del 
Pueblo in May–June 2011, and September–October 2012. 
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policy administration and the creation of new watershed-level institutions 
comprised of private and government representatives.47  Peru has the third 
largest volume of fresh water per capita in South America, but within the 
country, water is unequally distributed.  The country is comprised of three 
distinct regions: the well-watered but sparsely populated selva with 13% of the 
nation’s population of approximately thirty million inhabitants; the drier sierra, 
watered by mountain streams and glacial meltwaters, home to 32% of the 
population; and the arid coast, which is home to 54% of Peru’s population, the 
bulk of its industrial activity, and 77% of its irrigated land, much of which is 
devoted export agriculture.48  Approximately 98% of the nation’s water supply 
flows into the Amazon drainage, which contains 26% of the nation’s 
population.  The coast, in contrast, with less than 2% of the nation’s water, 
finds itself almost totally dependent on water coming out of the Andes.49 
This imbalance between population and industrial activity concentration 
on the one hand and water availability on the other is the product of 
agricultural and industrial policies enacted over the past century, but it is 
often viewed in terms of scarcity.  This emphasis on scarcity is reflected in 
massive government support for coastal irrigation and for the transfer of 
“excess” real water from the Amazon basin and the highlands—where it is 
integral to the maintenance of natural and agroecosystems and to domestic 
food security—to the coast where export agriculture predominates.50  One 
national water authority official interviewed in 2012 suggested that the 
concept of the watershed be enlarged to include places of water deficit and 
places of water abundance in order to encourage equitable sharing of the 
resource through its transfer from water-abundant to water-scarce regions.51   
Not all water transfers involve real water.  Over the past decade, 
economists have taken an increasing interest in transfers of what is termed 
                                                                                                                   
 47 Reglamento de la Ley de Recursos Hídricos, Ley No. 29338 (2009) (Peru), available at 
http://www.ana.gob.pe/media/533045/reglamento%20lrh%20-%20n%C2%BA%2029338.pdf. 
 48 INEI (Instituto Nacional de Estadisticas e Informatica), Annuario de Estadisticas 
Ambientales 23 (2011), available at http://www.inei.gob.pe/BiblioINEIPub/BancoPub/Est/Lib 
0978/Libro.pdf; Julio F. Alegria, The Challenges of Water Resource Management in Peru 6 
(2007), available at http://www.uwgb.edu/envsustain/Full_paper%20Challenges%20Water% 
20Resources%20_JF%20Alegria_.pdf. 
 49 J. Painter, UNDP, Deglaciation in the Andean Region, in 55 HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 
REPORT OFFICE OCCASIONAL PAPER (2007). 
 50 See Juana Vera Delgado & Linden Vincent, Community Irrigation Supplies and Regional 
Water Transfers in the Colca Valley, Peru (International Mountain Society 2013), available at 
http://www.bioone.org/doi/pdf/10.1659/MRD-JOURNAL-D-12-00119.1. 
 51 Interviews with National Water Authority engineers (names withheld), in Lima, Peru, 
(Sept. 21, 2012). 
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virtual water—or water in the form of agricultural products.52  Peru has more 
fresh water per capita than any other South American country.53  In a context 
of perceived world scarcity, the country becomes an attractive candidate for 
virtual water exports in the form of water-intensive crops even though water 
stress is often severe in the areas where export production takes place—areas 
where population and economic activities are also concentrated.  At present, 
Peru is exporting virtual water in the form of vegetables, table grapes, rice, 
animal feed, and biofuels.  Transfers of virtual water can have perverse 
outcomes, as in cases where water is transferred from water-scarce to water-
abundant localities.  In the Ica Valley, for example, asparagus production is 
creating water scarcity as it depletes local aquifers.  It is beginning to compete 
for water not only with small farmers and urban consumers in the lower Ica 
Valley, but with cultivators and livestock producers in the upstream region of 
Huancavelica.54  At a global level, very little of this produce is destined for 
arid countries; over half of Peru’s production finds its way to the United States, 
and most of the rest goes to Western Europe.55  The tradeoffs required for 
continuing emphasis on export agriculture are implied, but unstated in 
UNESCO’s WWDR4 conclusion that “[g]iven the intention of a number of 
countries in the region to play a major role in satisfying increased global 
demands for food and biofuels, irrigation will need to become more water-
                                                                                                                   
 52 See, e.g., UNESCO, Managing Water Under Uncertainty and Risk, in 4 UNITED NATIONS 
WORLD WATER DEVELOPMENT REPORT 10 (2012). 
 53 D. Olson, Recuros Hídricos, in PERU: LA OPORTUNIDAD DE UN PAIS DIFERENTE: 
PROSPERO, EQUITATIVO Y GOBERNABLE (M. Giugale et al. eds., 2006). 
 54 Gerardo Damonte, Dinamicas de Concentracion y Escasez de Agua: El Boom Agro-
Exportador y Los Pequenos Propietarios en la Cuenca Media y Alta del Rio Ica (2012); M.T. 
ORE ET AL., INSTITUTO DE ESTUDIOS PERUANOS, EL AGUA ANTE NUEVOS DESAFIOS: ACTORES E 
INICIATIVAS EN ECUADOR, PERU Y BOLIVIA (2009); Urteaga 2012; A.K. Chapagain & A.Y. 
Hoekstra, The Global Component of Freshwater Demand and Supply: An Assessment of 
Virtual Water Flows Between Nations As a Result of Trade in Agricultural and Industrial 
Products, in 33 WATER INTERNATIONAL 19–32 (2008); N. HEPWORTH, J.C. POSTIGO, B.G. 
DELGADO & P. KJELL, DROP BY DROP: UNDERSTANDING THE U.K.’S WATER FOOTPRINT 
THROUGH A CASE STUDY OF PERUVIAN ASPARAGUS (2010). 
 55 Peruvian Asparagus Exports Grow 13% Annually, ANDINA AGENCIA PERUANA DE 
NOTICIAS (Aug. 21, 2013), http://www.andina.com.pe/english/noticia-peruvian-asparagus-exp 
orts-grow-13-annually-471281.aspx. According to the website of Peru’s Ministry of 
Agriculture (MINAG), “Los principales países de destino de las exportaciones del espárrago 
fresco fueron principalmente EE.UU. con 69% del total de las exportaciones en el año 2006, 
seguido de los Países Bajos con 10%, Inglaterra con 9% y España con 8%.”  Comercio 
Mundial, PERU MINISTERIO DE AGRICULTURA Y RIEGO 3 (2013), http://www.minag.gob.pe/por 
tal/sector-agrario/agricola/cultivos-de-importancia-nacional/esp%C3%A1rragos/comercio-mu 
ndial21?start=2.  
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efficient.”56  The implication is that all irrigators, whether or not they are 
engaged in the export of virtual water, will have to share the burden of 
installing expensive new irrigation equipment on their lands.  Revenues 
returned to the state from virtual water exports may be used to produce 
valuable social goods, but within stressed watersheds—including the Río Santa 
valley—ecosystem health and the livelihoods of the poorest and most 
vulnerable water users, already endangered, would be further impaired.  
Water scarcity discourse has also stimulated investment in farmland as a 
vehicle for virtual water exports.  In Peru, considerable resources have been 
devoted to what is termed expansion of the agricultural frontier.  In practice 
this has meant construction of large-scale irrigation works to bring water to 
arid lands, which are then sold to large foreign and domestic agroexport 
investors through public auctions.57   Smaller and Mann conclude that “what 
are often described now as land grabs [foreign investments in farmland in 
Africa and the Americas] are really water grabs: the purchase or long-term 
lease of land in order to obtain the water rights that come with the land under 
domestic law or with the investment contract itself.”58  The authors go on to 
state that these investments shift water to “essentially long-distance farming” 
at the risk of displacing local food producers and taking away their water 
rights and that these transfers are more likely where free trade agreements 
are in place.59  In other words, at a global level, scarcity concerns are 
stimulating foreign investment in land for the capture of virtual water.  In 
Peru, these investments are occurring in conjunction with the expansion of 
large-scale irrigation, aquifer mining and land concentration.60 
Big coastal irrigation systems existed in Peru’s coastal region in 
prehistory, but they were built with increasing frequency in the early 
twentieth century.61  Beginning in the 1970s, large-scale water transfer and 
irrigation projects were undertaken with the purpose of opening new lands on 
                                                                                                                   
 56 UNESCO, MANAGING WATER UNDER UNCERTAINTY AND RISK, 4 UNITED NATIONS 
WORLD WATER DEVELOPMENT REPORT 203 (Caroline Andrzejewski et al. eds., 2012). 
 57 Zulema Burneo, The Process of Land Concentration in Peru, INT’L LAND COAL. 14 (Jan. 
2011), http://www.landcoalition.org/sites/default/files/publication/1022/PERU_ENG_web_21.0 
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 58 Carin Smaller & Howard Mann, Thirst for Distant Lands: Foreign Investment in 
Agricultural Land and Water, INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., FOREIGN INVESTMENT FOR 
SUSTAINABLE DEV. PROGRAM 3 (May 2009), http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2009/thirst_for_distant_ 
lands.pdf (alteration in original). 
 59 Id. at 7–11. 
 60 Burneo, supra note 57, at 11–33; Damonte supra note 54. 
 61 Burneo, supra note 57, at 11–33. 
82 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.  [Vol. 42:69 
 
 
the coast.62  As noted above, increasingly the objective of these massive 
projects is to improve state lands for sale to investors, effectively augmenting 
water demand.   
One ongoing effort is the Olmos-Transandino project.  Still under 
construction, the ecologically and socially problematic Olmos project 
includes a recently completed nineteen kilometer long tunnel that diverts 
water from the Huancabamba River, an eastward flowing Amazon tributary 
to the Pacific drainage on the North coast.63  By the 1990s, state-funded 
projects were undertaken with a new objective: improvement of state lands 
for sale to investors and export-oriented agroenterprises.  The Olmos 
Transfer project, for example, called for expropriation of 110,000 hectares of 
irrigable land belonging to campesino communities for sale to agribusiness 
producers.64  So, infrastructure improvement in Peru, justified by the threat 
of scarcity, has helped to fuel an agroexport boom and a corollary transfer of 
virtual water to the water-abundant United States and Western Europe.  As a 
result, demand for water has expanded enormously.  Where subterranean 
waters are exploited, as in Ica and Lambayeque, water scarcity is indeed 
being produced.      
A.  Scarcity and Water Commodification 
The definition of water as an economic good, enshrined in the Dublin 
Principles, is based on the premise that market mechanisms would result in 
its more efficient use and allocation among uses.65  One way of treating 
water as an economic good is pricing it in a way that ensures conservation.  
But unless the price of water is calibrated with the ability to pay, pricing 
simply shifts water to its most profitable rather than its most essential uses.  
At this point, the Peruvian government has not enacted national water pricing 
policies, although this is occurring in some municipalities. 
                                                                                                                   
 62 Id. at 2. 
 63 WWF (Worldwide Fund for Nature), PIPEDREAMS? INTERBASIN WATER TRANSFERS AND 
WATER SHORTAGES 23 (2007), available at http://www.wwf.or.jp/activities/lib/pdf_freshwate 
r/freshwater/pipedreams_27_june_2007_1.pdf. 
 64 Id.; Eduardo Zegarra, Mercardo y Reforma de la Gestión del Agua en Peru, in REVISTA 
DE LA CEPAL 83, 107–20 (Aug. 2004). 
 65 See, e.g., HELEN INGRAM ET AL., The Importance of Equity and the Limits of Efficiency in 
Water Resources, in WATER, PLACE, AND EQUITY  (C.J.M. Whitely et al. eds., 2008), available 
at http://mitpress2.mit.edu/books/chapters/0262232715chap1.pdf. 
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Water rights can be allocated in a number of ways.  The Peruvian water 
law declares water to be the property of the state.66  The law recognizes the 
preexisting water rights of indigenous and campesino communities, although 
this recognition can be construed quite narrowly, and the rights are not 
antecedent to, but rather granted by the national water authority.67  Moreover, 
the government may use its authority to distribute water according to what it 
deems to be the highest and best use, overriding other legal commitments.68   
In Andean communities, rights to surface water are typically tied to land 
and to contributions to irrigation system maintenance.69  Some economists 
favor full commodification of water through the creation of simple, 
transferrable water rights.70  Where water is treated as alienable property, this 
would in principle facilitate its flow from places of abundance to places of 
scarcity, enhancing spatial equity.  But, in Peru, full commodification of water 
would manufacture scarcity in two ways.  Just as real estate markets exclude 
the poor from housing while creating new demands for real property, market 
pricing of water and water rights would restrict or even exclude poorer 
cultivators and urban water users from access to a safe and reliable water 
supply as it increases demand.  This would result in differential access.71   
Second, commodification creates scarcities when it facilitates the transfer 
of water to places and uses where its application would be most profitable.  
The Olmos Project is an example, but Stensrud and Andersen also make this 
point in a study of irrigation in the Colca Valley following construction of 
the massive Majes project, which transferred water from campesino 
communities to agribusiness enterprises on the coast.72  So, we have here a 
Catch-22.  Where fear of scarcity fosters implementation of market-based 
approaches to water allocation, water stress and apparent scarcity is produced 
as water is shifted from life-sustaining to profit-generating uses.   
                                                                                                                   
 66 Reglamento de la Ley de Recursos Hídricos, Ley No. 29338, Titulo I, Art. 2 (Peru). 
 67 Capitulo III, Art. 64. 
 68 Id. at Titulo 1, Art. 2 
 69 See Rutgerd Boelens, The Politics of Disciplining Water Rights, 40 DEV. & CHANGE 307, 
309–10 (2009) (analyzing official policies incorporate local water laws). 
 70 Power, Water, and Money, supra note 16, at 49. 
 71 Alana Boland, The Trickle-down Effect: Ideology and the Development of Premium 
Water Networks in China’s Cities, INT’L J. URB. REGIONAL RES. 21–40 (Mar. 2007) (reporting 
that economic liberalization in China in the 1990s was accompanied by differentiated access 
to urban water and a process of splintering urbanism that limited access to clean household 
water to wealthier citizens). 
 72 Astrid Stensrud & Astrid Andersen, A NEW WATER CULTURE?  TECHNOLOGIES AND 
TERMINOLOGIES OF WATER AND CLIMATE CHANGE IN PERU (1969) (Paper prepared for Annual 
Congress of the Latin American Studies Association, San Francisco).     
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B.  Peruvian Water Politics and the Production of Scarcity   
While the treatment of water as an economic good is a major driver of 
scarcity, shortfalls may be created even where full marketization is absent.  
Scarcity can be politically produced where states seek to encourage or simply 
ignore activities that are highly water consumptive.  At a national or 
watershed level, the result is expansion of demand.  To meet new water 
demands, states may encourage aquifer mining and large water transfer 
projects that produce scarcity.   
This is indeed happening in Peru where water marketization has yet to 
occur.  The nation’s 1969 water law abolished private ownership of water 
making it property of the state.73  “Administrative control resided [and still 
does] with the Ministry of Agriculture, which supervised a nested hierarchy of 
water user associations.”74  In highland communities, associations established 
by law operated side by side with autonomous local irrigator organizations.75  
Communities accepting state aid for irrigation improvements were expected to 
bring local water institutions into conformity with the water code.  The 1969 
water law called for more efficient water allocation and creation of new rights, 
but allowed for adjustments to changing patterns of demand, particularly 
during periods of drought.76  The law should have made water allocation more 
equitable and reduced vulnerability to drought, but enforcement was erratic 
and private interests often prevailed.77   
In the 1990s, the government of President Alberto Fujimori drafted 
legislation that would have privatized water and created tradable water 
rights, but irrigators vociferously opposed the changes and the bill was 
scrapped when Fujimori left office in 2000 in the face of mounting 
scandals.78  Subsequent governments have recognized water as belonging to 
the nation.79  This retreat from a strong neoliberal position is reflected in the 
2009 water law which also recognizes the rights of indigenous and 
                                                                                                                   
 73 Ley General de Aguas, Decreto Ley N°17752 (Peru), available at http://www.congreso. 
gob.pe/ntley/Imagenes/Leyes/17752.pdf. 
 74 Lynch, supra note 94, at 9. 
 75 Id. at 370; PAUL. H. GELLES, WATER AND POWER IN HIGHLAND PERU: THE CULTURAL 
POLITICS OF IRRIGATION AND DEVELOPMENT 135 (Rutgers Univ. Press 2000). 
 76 Ley General de Aguas, Decreto Ley N°17752 (Peru). 
 77 PAUL B. TRAWICK, THE STRUGGLE FOR WATER IN PERU: COMEDY AND TRAGEDY IN THE 
ANDEAN COMMONS 240 (Stanford Univ. Press 2003). 
 78 Symantha A. Slaughter-Holben, Demand Management and Peruvian Highland Irrigation 
Systems, 22 POL. & LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY REV. 14, 14–15 (1999). 
 79 Zegarra, supra note 64, at 107–20. 
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campesino communities to manage water according to their uses and 
customs (usos y costumbres).80  Like the 1969 law, it can, as many irrigators 
fear, be used to justify water privatization, but to date, outright privatization 
of water and creation of water markets has not happened.81  Simplification of 
water rights is a more likely outcome.  If the emergent regime creates a 
unified legal framework encompassing all water uses, it would, as Boelens 
argues, reduce the array of possible water sharing arrangements that could be 
implemented under changing climatic conditions and undermine the ability 
of water user groups to collectively manage water.82 
In sum, much of what looks like scarcity in Peru is simply inequitable or 
constrained access to relatively clean water resulting from policies that have 
(1) encouraged expansion of demand, particularly in arid areas, (2) turned a 
blind eye to water contamination by mining and manufacturing activity, (3) 
encouraged aquifer mining and the transfer of water from the highlands to 
the arid coast, and (4) created institutional forms that systematically under-
represent the most vulnerable urban and rural water users.  In addition, 
intraregional and interregional inequities are responsible for the production 
of scarcities in highland Peru, deepening the vulnerability of poor rural 
communities to climate-related stress.  
Government policies have stimulated expansion of demand by fostering 
the growth of the nation’s mining, export agriculture, and energy sectors.  
These constraints are produced by an inequitable distribution of political 
power and a lack of sectoral or jurisdictional representation rather than water 
scarcity per se.  With climate change and the absence of equitable water 
governance, water pollution and diversion are giving rise to water conflicts 
and exacerbating the vulnerability of neighborhoods, communities, and 
ecosystems.   
IV.  WATER COMPETITION AND SCARCITY IN THE SANTA WATERSHED83 
The Río Santa watershed, as noted above, has become something of a 
poster child for climate-induced water scarcity.  Indeed, water stress in the 
valley is intensifying, and numerous water conflicts have erupted over the 
                                                                                                                   
 80 Reglamento de la Ley de Recursos Hídricos, Ley No. 29338, Titulo III, Art. 64 (Peru). 
 81 Zegarra, supra note 64, at 107–20. 
 82 Boelens, supra note 69. 
 83 Unless otherwise noted, this section is based on data from interviews with government 
officials, community leaders, and NGO personnel conducted from 2007–2012 in the cities of 
Huaraz, Lima, and Marcara in the communities of Vicos, Canrey Chico, and Catac. 
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past decade.84  International capital, working in tandem with national 
enterprises and the Peruvian state, has been a major contributor to water 
stress in the Río Santa watershed.  Enterprises in the mining, energy, and 
export-agriculture sectors have claimed water rights, tacitly and quasi-legally 
in the case of the mining industry (which sees itself, and is seen by the state, 
as a minor water user despite its serious impacts on water quality) and the 
hydropower industry.  Agribusiness enterprises in the large coastal irrigated 
areas have received formal water rights together with irrigable land.  These 
favored industries compete for water and land with domestic food and 
livestock production, mountaineering and ecotourism, a growing aquaculture 
industry, and urban water systems.  Water contamination by mine wastes, 
untreated sewage, and agrichemicals constitutes a serious threat to public 
health and to the integrity and sustainability of natural and agroecosystems.   
Water conflicts have proliferated as a result of these activities.  Some of 
these conflicts pit jurisdictions against one another; others involve 
competition for water among economic sectors and subsectors.  While most 
sectoral conflicts have an upstream-downstream dimension, this is not 
always true of jurisdictional competition among communities, municipalities, 
or regions.  Environmental justice respect for existing community and 
municipal water rights lie at the core of many conflicts. 
Conflict has taken different forms at different points in the watershed.  In 
the high Andes (above 3,300 meters), water disputes are often mine-related.85  
The mining sector mushroomed in the 1990s.86  In 2010, minerals accounted 
for 61% of export earnings.87  Transnational enterprises pay royalties to the 
government, some of which returns to regional and local governments where 
the mines operate.88  Mine royalties are narrowly targeted, while 
                                                                                                                   
 84 Examples of transnational enterprises that have affected water quality and access include 
Barrick Mining Company and Duke Energy.  For a discussion of Duke’s claims, see Mark 
Carey, The Politics of Place: Inhabiting and Defending Glacier Hazard Zones in Peru’s 
Cordillera Blanca, in DARKENING PEAKS: GLACIER RETREAT, SCIENCE, AND SOCIETY 229, 
181–91 (Ben Orlove, Ellen Wiegandt & Brian H. Luckman eds., 2008). 
 85 Barbara Deutsch Lynch, International Conference at Yale University: Water Access, 
Food Sovereignty, and Peru’s Water Regime 13 (Sept. 14–15, 2013) (http://www.yale.edu/ag 
rarianstudies/foodsovereignty/pprs/30_Lynch_2013.pdf). 
 86 ALANA WILSON, PERU’S SOCIAL CONFLICT IS ABOUT MORE THAN MINING 1 (Fraser 
Institute 2012), available at http://www.fraserinstitute.org/uploadedFiles/fraser-ca/Content/res 
earch-news/research/articles/perus-social-conflict-is-about-more-than-mining.pdf. 
 87 Peru Exports Rise 31.1 Percent in 2010 to Record Levels, ANDEAN AIR MAIL & 
PERUVIAN TIMES, Jan. 29, 2011, http://www.peruviantimes.com/ 29/peru-exports-rise-31-1-per 
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 88 Damonte, supra note 54. 
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environmental impacts of mining are diffuse.  As transnational mining 
operations proliferated, so did small marginal enterprises lacking pollution 
controls.  Extraction and road building bring arsenic and heavy metals to the 
surface and into the Santa, and leaching from old mine tailings continues 
unabated.  Both are polluting the Santa and making some of its tributaries too 
toxic for irrigation or domestic use.  Road building and the movement of 
heavy equipment through the spongy terrain of the high meadows (puna) is 
reducing the water storage capability of the land and may well contribute to 
absolute scarcity down the road.  Mining is also blamed for stream 
acidification and reduction of vegetative cover in Huascarán National Park, a 
reserve encompassing much of the Cordillera Blanca and surrounding puna 
lands.89  In addition, ores are often washed with water to separate useful ore 
from tailings, but Ministry of Energy and Mines (MEM) officials charged 
with monitoring pollution are reluctant to impose sanctions that could affect 
the financial performance of the sector.90   
In December 2010, a decision by MEM to grant a permit for mineral 
exploration on the shores of Lake Conococha, the Santa’s headwaters, led to 
a massive protest by livestock-producing and farming communities, urban 
water users, and defenders of the Huascarán National Park.91  Protesters 
blocked the highway from Lima to Huaraz and marched in the streets of the 
region’s cities calling for cancellation of the license to pollute.  The conflict 
abated only when the government suspended the exploration permit.92  In 
January 2011, responding to coalition demands, the national water authority 
declared that mining exploration and other industrial activities would not 
proceed in the wetland near the lake shore.93   
                                                                                                                   
 89 See Walter Silverio, Cordillera Blanca, http://www.grid.unep.ch/activities/global_chan 
ge/cordillera.php (last updated July 5, 2010). See generally Milagros Sosa & Margreet 
Zwarteveen, Exploring the Politics of Water Grabbing: The Case of Large Mining Operations 
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The 2010 conflict was about many things, but it was not about water 
scarcity.  In the first instance, it was about competing and incompatible uses 
of land and water—mining versus agriculture and domestic use.  It also had 
to do with ecosystem protection within a national park and the right of a 
campesino community to control land and water use within its boundaries. 
A somewhat similar, less widespread, but far more protracted conflict took 
place in the Callejón de Huaylas, or the middle river basin.  This part of the 
watershed is home to Andean farming systems, commercial agriculture, small-
scale mining, and numerous small urban settlements.  Despite urbanization, 
outmigration, and land abandonment, the Callejón remains a reservoir of 
agrobiodiversity; its cultivators make a substantial contribution to regional 
food security.94  Deterioration of potable water and small-scale irrigation 
infrastructure built in the 1960s and ‘70s is reducing water accessibility for 
small farmers and domestic water users. Competition between irrigators, 
domestic water users, and the energy sector has become intense.   
An illustrative dispute was over rights to Laguna Parón, a glacial lake 
high in the Cordillera Blanca.  In 2008, Cruz de Mayo, a campesino 
community, blocked access to the lake to protest water withdrawals for 
power generation.95  One protagonist in the Parón conflict was a Duke 
Energy subsidiary authorized to manage the Cañon del Pato hydroelectric 
plant which supplies power to the region’s cities and industries and to the 
national grid.96  Demand for electricity has expanded rapidly in Peru and in 
the region, due in no small part to growth in the mining industry.97  To offset 
variations in Río Santa flow and meet peak power demand, Duke drew water 
from Lake Parón.98  The company claimed the right to control releases partly 
on its purported property rights to the lake and partly on the claim that its 
technical expertise could prevent disaster.99  
                                                                                                                   
 94 Barbara Deutsch Lynch, Equity, Vulnerability and Water Governance: Responding to 
Climate Change in the Peruvian Andes 13, available at http://www.icid18.org/files/articles/5 
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 95 Lynch, supra note 85, at 13. 
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 98 See Aiello, supra note 96 (outlining the conflict at Lake Paron).  
 99 Fraser, supra note 96. 
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But its releases were incompatible with the irrigation needs of communities 
with long-standing rights to lake water, including Cruz de Mayo.  Water often 
came at the wrong time of day, and its flow, too rapid for irrigation, caused soil 
erosion.  The small city of Caraz also depended upon the lake for its domestic 
water supply, but during dry periods Duke’s releases left insufficient water to 
meet urban needs.  The blockade lasted eighteen months as officials from 
Caraz and surrounding communities petitioned the government for redress.100  
After months of negotiation, the national water authority announced that the 
lake was part of the Huascarán National Park and “the property of all 
Peruvians” and that communities with preexisting rights to lake water would 
control releases for agriculture, drinking water, and hydropower on the 
condition that Duke be allowed to lower the lake level should it become 
dangerously high.101  The agreement fell apart in 2011 when a Constitutional 
Court ruled in favor of Duke’s right to the lake.102  Local groups vowed to 
continue their protest against Duke’s control of lake levels.103 
The Lake Parón conflict was not about scarcity but about access, timing, 
and rights claims based on two fundamentally different views of how and by 
whom water should be governed.  Rights claims legitimated by a faith in 
expert management were pitted against “traditional” rights claims grounded 
in local knowledge and underlain by a sense of place-based equity.  As one 
local activist argued, “We must make clear that the water could disappear 
and with it the life support for many communities and the town of Caraz.  
The right to life and to manage one’s own resources is in play.”104  
In its lower reaches, the Río Santa forms the boundary between the 
regions of Ancash and La Libertad, and a substantial fraction of the 
watershed lies within the latter’s boundaries.  Antagonism between the 
regions has been marked.105  Regional competition is aggravated by the 
presence of two large coastal irrigation and water transfer systems: Chinecas 
in the Region of Ancash and CHAVIMOCHIC, Alan García’s pet project in 
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the Aprista region of La Libertad.  These compete for the Santa’s waters.106  
Still under construction, CHAVIMOCHIC transfers water into the Chau, 
Viru, Mochica, and Chicama valleys for irrigation, power generation, and 
urban water supply for the city of Trujillo.107  The project, now in phase three 
of development, vastly increases demand for Río Santa water at a time when 
supply is likely to become more variable, if not more limited, due to climate 
change.  CHAVIMOCHIC irrigated area is considerable.  In 2006, 86% was 
concentrated in the hands of eleven agribusiness enterprises.108  Of these, a 
single asparagus producer purchased 33% of all the land reclaimed during 
the first two phases of the project.109  Chinecas is an older scheme.  It is less 
than half the size of its rival and appears to be somewhat less dominated by 
huge agroexport enterprises.  Chinecas is supposed to supply water for the 
city of Chimbote and to irrigated lands in the coastal reaches of the Nepeña 
and Casma valleys, but its infrastructure is in poor shape, and water from the 
main canal only gets as far as the Nepeña valley.  Both water transfer 
projects have reduced the supply available to older and smaller coastal 
irrigation canals serving local food producers and to Chimbote, Peru’s third 
largest city.110  Here one could argue that scarcity is a major driver of water 
conflict, but scarcity is politically produced.  The likelihood of equitable 
allocation not only among the two irrigated areas but also among water users 
living and working downstream is reduced by a long tradition of regional 
antagonism fueled by national partisan politics. 
As these cases indicate, competition in the Santa watershed is still largely 
local, but serious upstream-downstream imbalances exist in the irrigation 
sector.  The upper basin accounts for 40% of the watershed’s irrigated area and 
70% of its irrigators, while the coast accounts for some 70% of irrigated area 
(about 135,000 ha) and 30% of irrigators.111  This imbalance will become more 
marked when the latest phases of the two projects are completed.   
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CHAVIMOCHIC landowners are entitled to a fixed yearly allocation of 
10,000 m3/ha.112  In contrast, the water rights of highland irrigators are 
defined in terms of access to a canal’s total flow for a fixed time period, so 
the latter get less water during droughts.  Nonetheless, large coastal 
agroenterprises fear that climate change will affect their access to water.  In 
2008, Peru’s Association of Exporters demanded that the government 
guarantee their access to sufficient water to prevent anticipated losses.113  If 
met, this request would mean taking water away from highland food 
producers and urban residents in order to transform it into virtual water 
through the production of agroexports.  To date, it does not appear that 
highland irrigators have experienced reductions in water supply as a result of 
transfers to the special projects, although Bury et al. suggest that this is 
imminent.114  A more immediate source of tension is the role that the former 
are assigned in water conservation.  Highland irrigators have been assigned 
the role of watershed protection; they are being asked to plant trees on their 
land and to install expensive water saving irrigation technologies.  In 
response, local irrigation officials and community leaders argue for a quid 
pro quo: if coastal enterprises want more water, they need to pay highland 
cultivators to adopt conservation measures—whether hi-tech irrigation 
systems or reforestation. 
In sum, if we look at water competition in the Santa watershed, we find 
that it occurs less because water is scarce than because its multiple uses are 
incompatible.  Water demand for power generation and agroexports has been 
growing as a result of the government policies of the past twenty-five years, 
while policies that have favored growth of mining have rendered water unfit 
for irrigation or human and animal consumption.  There is an intimate 
relationship between agroexport growth and scarcity discourse because the 
latter has been used to justify construction of the water transfer apparatus 
that has allowed this growth to occur.  In addition, because they use 
sophisticated irrigation technologies, agribusinesses are portrayed as modern 
and water conserving even though they are responsible for the export of 
virtual water that could be used to enhance food security.  Yet, it is likely 
                                                                                                                   
 112 Fernando Chanduvi, Changing Deserts into Agricultural Lands, 24 GRID MAGAZINE 6–8 
(Feb. 2006), available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/009/a0409e/A0409E03.htm#ch3.1. 
 113 Lynch, supra note 85, at 15. 
 114 See Jeffrey Bury et al.,  New Geographies of Water and Climate Change in Peru: 
Coupled Natural and Social Transformations in the Santa River Watershed, 103 ANNALS OF 
THE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN GEOGRAPHERS 363, 363–74 (2013) (using models to predict 
future shifts in water availability and human reaction). 
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that as water supply becomes erratic due to deglaciation, scarcity will be 
experienced most severely by those water users lacking secure water rights. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
While water stress is prevalent in the Santa watershed, conflict is not 
about scarcity but about competition resulting from jurisdictional conflict, 
the incompatibility of different sectoral uses of water, and access to water, 
which is inequitable and uneven at best.  In addition, water stress is being 
produced by mine pollution that makes the river’s water unfit for irrigation 
or livestock and human consumption, and in the future, it may be 
manufactured by water transfers to the lands of agroexport investors.  
Alternatives to scarcity-creating water regimes are present in some Andean 
communities where water rights are tied to community membership, place, 
water supply, the agricultural cycle and labor contributions to system operation 
and maintenance.  These regimes are, at least normatively, responsive to 
vulnerabilities produced by drought because they entail obligations to the 
water resource, and in times of scarcity a moral economy of subsistence may 
come into play.  At the river basin level, water regimes based on 
complementarity encourage conservation and improve water quality.     
Lastly, we need to turn our attention to political issues of representation 
and exclusion.  While there is support for water user consultation on paper, 
Peruvian institutions have much to do to make inclusion of the most 
vulnerable water users in decision-making roles a reality.  Policies that 
recognize the relationship between water and land and the importance of 
water in sustaining local ecosystems, programs that encourage 
complementarity, and inclusive institutions may in the end contribute more 
to sustainability and conservation than those based on a fear of scarcity. 
 
 
